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The hangover from the rich countries' housing bust is likely to depress growth and keep 
unemployment high in 2011 – and for much of the next decade. But the dream of homeownership is 
very much alive – and is a powerful economic force – in the emerging world. 
he financial crisis that began in 2007 had its roots in excesses in the housing market that 
remained unresolved in 2010 – and that will continue to roil economies in 2011 and beyond. 
Everybody now knows about America’s dodgy ‘subprime’ mortgages (the term says it all). 
But it is all too easy to forget that the development of this market was initially welcomed, because it 
enabled even people who would not normally qualify for a mortgage loan to aspire to 
homeownership. Subprime mortgages made the American dream come true. 
Of course, billions of others around the world share the same dream. But the way housing finance is 
organised differs enormously from country to country, and these differences explain the recent 
global imbalances and financial crashes. 
In developed economies, construction can add only a relatively small amount each year to the 
existing stock of housing. With populations stagnating (or declining in many parts of Europe and 
Japan), the existing stock of housing is exchanged among different parts of the population, and 
typically bequeathed from old to young. 
The situation is different in emerging economies, where the quantity and quality of the existing 
stock of housing are woefully inadequate. Moreover, most of the existing housing tends to be in 
rural areas, whereas most of the jobs are in the cities. This is why urbanisation means a huge 
building boom in emerging economies. China, as usual, is the most extreme example, now 
accounting for more than one-half of global cement consumption. 
The dream of homeownership is thus very much alive – and is a powerful economic force – in the 
emerging world. But mortgage markets remain underdeveloped in most emerging economies. This 
means that young Chinese couples will first have to save a large part of their income as a down 
payment for their dream house (typically an apartment in a high-rise). The absence of ‘no money 
down’ mortgages might be more important than Confucian ethics in explaining China’s high 
savings rate. One sure way to reduce the savings rate in China would be to develop an American-
style mortgage market there. 
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The Chinese and others should, however, bear in mind that an increase in housing prices does not 
make a country richer. Of course, every homeowner will feel richer if his property’s price goes up. 
But if the price of all housing goes up, the country as a whole is no better off; after all, people have 
to live somewhere, so, other things being equal, cashing in on higher house prices would merely 
mean paying more for one’s next home. Housing booms thus create only an illusion of wealth, 
though it is compelling enough to induce excessive consumption, as occurred in the United States 
over the last decade. 
Conversely, a crash in house prices does not destroy any real wealth (the houses still stand). On the 
contrary, a crash makes the dream of ownership more affordable, which benefits first-time buyers – 
typically the young and less well-off. 
But, from an economic point of view, the share of homeowners versus tenants is not very important. 
If the rental market is well developed (as in, say, Germany), most families might elect not to own. 
But Germans still own indirectly the houses they live in through their investments with life-
insurance companies and savings societies, which own and manage a large proportion of the 
country’s housing estates. 
By contrast, from an economic point of view, many American households really rent their homes 
from the Chinese government. They might be proud homeowners on paper, but their mortgage was 
probably underwritten by quasi-governmental institutions like Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, which 
in turn rely heavily on capital from China for their own refinancing. 
The real danger arises when everyone is convinced that investing in real estate is the best way to 
secure one’s own future because house prices can only go up. This induces lenders to provide not 
only NINJA (no income, no job, no assets) mortgages, but also generous loans to real-estate 
developers to build ever-larger mansions and housing communities. 
As long as a boom lasts, everybody benefits. But when the bubble bursts, the NINJAs cannot 
service their debt and builders go into bankruptcy. Lenders find that the collateral (half-finished or 
empty houses) is worth almost nothing, resulting in huge losses in the banking system (as the US 
found out in 2008). In extreme cases, as in Ireland (one hopes not in Spain), the need to save the 
banking system can bankrupt an entire country. 
Housing booms can last a long time, typically more than a decade. The downside is that housing 
busts last equally long, because houses are such a durable good. Once too many houses have been 
built, the existing overhang depresses the market for a very long time, and unemployed construction 
workers are usually unable to find jobs elsewhere. 
The last decade saw the peak of an unprecedented housing boom in most of the rich world. The 
bust, with its banking problems and unemployment, is likely to last for most of the coming decade, 
depressing growth in all those countries that looked so strong in 2008. 
By contrast, the emerging economies have barely started their own boom, which is underpinned by 
the spillover of liquidity from the US. The emerging world’s boom might well stretch over the 
entire next decade, as hundreds of millions of homes are built. The next bust can be avoided only if 
emerging markets manage the dream of homeownership better than the US and Europe. 